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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

A)

This

is

a premises liability case involving Victor Dupuis (“Dupuis”)

he slipped-and-fell in the parking
d/b/a/ Eastern Idaho Regional

Falls,

lot

0f the hospital owned by Eastern Idaho Health Services,

Medical Center.

Idaho area on the day 0f

A

signiﬁcant amount of

EIRMC’s

melted those surfaces throughout the day and only stopped
Despite this continuous snow removal

when he

effort,

he recognized that the parking

his car,

While proceeding across the
thereafter against

EIRMC

lot this

lot

was

it

he

still

left

contractor,

B&K

pm.

that

EIRMC’S

parking

to Visit his wife,

the hospital

two hours

that day.

lot

who had been

later to return t0

from the compacted snow and

slippery

for his injury. Following extensive discovery,

He

was

ice.

timely ﬁled suit

EIRMC

sought and was

appealed.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

B)

Dupuis ﬁled

suit

on November

15, 2018, against Eastern

Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (“EIRMC”).
alleged that he

owed

t0

him

was an

invites

as an invitee.

R V01.

on EIRMC’S premises and

R V01.

1,

pp. 9 (at

[r

1,

that

4) and 10 (at

[r

Idaho Health Services, Inc. d/b/a

pp. 8-12. In his Complaint,

EIRMC

judgment 0n January
its

15, 2020.

R Vol.

1,

pp. 33-35.

Dupuis

breached the duty 0f care

9).

After completion of a substantial amount 0f discovery,

by

the Idaho

had stopped snowing

second time Dupuis slipped-and-fell.

summary judgment. Dupuis timely

granted

after

Dupuis observed

When

fell in

Inc.,

parking lots and sidewalks and ice

arrived that evening at approximately 6:00

admitted into the hospital earlier that day.

snow

EIRMC’S snow removal

incident.

this

Professional Services, Inc., continuously plowed

slippery

Who was injured When

EIRMC moved

for

summary

EIRMC’s summary judgment was

supported

memorandum 0f authority and by the sworn declarations 0f its

Respondent Brief -

1

counsel and of Brent Martin,

who

is

the principal of

its

snow removal

contractor,

B&K Professional

Thirteen separate exhibits were attached t0 these declarations:

deposition;

(ii)

excerpts from Carol Dupuis’ deposition;

(iii)

excerpts from

from Brent Martin’s deposition;

Commerce, National Centers

(viii)

copy 0f Dr. Dalling’s post-op
(Vii)

copy 0f United States Department 0f

for Environmental Information, weather data for Idaho Falls, Idaho

for January 23, 2017,

and January 24, 2017

(“certiﬁed weather data”); (Xi) a copy ofthe signed October 30, 2013 Landscape Maintenance

Snow Removal Agreement and Procedure
Removal Agreement”);

(xii)

entered into between

B&K’s

activity logs for the

1,

pp. 36-175.

facts

In

motion for summary judgment,

EIRMC

0f record establish that Dupuis was a licensee 0n

EIRMC

did not Violate the duty of care

any duty

to warn.

R V01.

1,

In his opposition to

EIRMC owed an

if he

it

owed

EIRMC’S motion

assumed duty of care

even

B&K

(“Snow

2017 (“KIPI weather almanac

t0

him

its

2017, and January 24, 2017.

R V01.

argued that the undisputed material

premises

at the

time of his

and

fall

that

as a licensee, including but not limited t0

pp. 43-44.

the time of his fall and that

alternative; (3)

and

regularly kept business records concerning weather documentation and

EIRMC hospital premises for January 23,

its

EIRMC

and

a copy of the local weather station, KIPI’s, almanac weather data for

the Idaho Falls, Idaho, area for January 23, 2017, and January 24,

data”); and, (xiii)

a

excerpts from Noelle Dupuis’ deposition;

(X) a certiﬁed

month 0f January 2017 and hourly data

for the

Gordon Dupuis’

copy 0f Promontory Point admission record for Dupuis;

copy of EIRMC’S discharge summary for Dupuis;
(ix) excerpts

(“B&K).

excerpts from Victor Dupuis’

(i)

deposition; (iv) excerpts from Spencer Steel’s deposition; (V) a
patient record for Dupuis; (Vi) a

Services, Inc.

EIRMC

were found

to

for

summary judgment, Dupuis argued

him beyond premises

violated the duty

to

owed

be a licensee, that

Respondent Brief - 2

liability; (2)

t0

EIRMC

him
still

that: (1)

he was an invitee

at

as an invitee; 0r, in the

violated the duty

it

owed

t0

warn him

On

as a licensee 0f the condition of its parking

February

7,

2020,

EIRMC

to

Dupuis and

also

that

reafﬁrmed

that if he

its

reply brief,

its

to strike the opinions

was a

District Court to

to strike the opinions

1 1.

on

licensee

pp. 3, 6.

1, p.

On February

12,

On February

R V01.

law.

R V01.

facts

0f

fall.

R Vol.

416.

5, p.

this case

The

and found

5, pp.

that

0f

to

14,

2020.

R V01.

R. V01.

t0

5, pp.

415-422.

Dupuis arose

5, p.

415; Tr V01.

EIRMC’S motions under
its

Memorandum

The

District Court

in Idaho’s premises liability

Court thereafter applied that law t0 the undisputed material

Dupuis was a licensee 0n EIRMC’S premises

this case.

R

V01.

5,

its

and

397-404.

417-418. After concluding that Dupuis was a licensee

Dupuis as a licensee 0n

fall

EIRMC’S

at the

at the

time of his

time of his

the district court next looked to Idaho’ s premises liability law t0 determine the duty of care

owed

EIRMC

time 0f his

26, 2020, the District Court issued

EIRMC owed

District

4, pp.

the District Court took

Decision and Order granting summary judgment.

found that the relevant duty 0f care

at the

301-305.

2020, Dupuis ﬁled his opposition to

0f his expert, Roland York.

25.

motion for summary

be a licensee then such ﬁnding would be dispositive

At the conclusion 0f oral arguments,

advisement. Tr V01.

its

R V01. 2, pp.

premises

its

Hearing on the pending motions was held on February

1,

pp. 204-209.

EIRMC argued that it had not assumed an afﬁrmative duty 0f care

position that Dupuis

R Vol. 2, pp. 305-3

1,

0f Dupuis’ snow removal expert,

sole duty of care arose in premises liability.

were found by the

0fthe case.

motion

its

R V01.

ﬁled a reply brief in support of

judgment accompanied by a new motion
Roland York. In

lot.

fall,

EIRMC

premises and applied that law to the undisputed material facts

pp. 420-422.

In so doing, the District Court found that the undisputed

material facts established that “Dupuis’ knowledge of the condition 0f the parking lot

was

at least

equal t0 the knowledge of EIRMC” and, therefore, that Dupuis could not prevail on his claim, as
a licensee, that

EIRMC violated its duty t0 warn him as

a licensee.

Respondent Brief -

3

R Vol.

5,

pp. 421-422.

Based

upon

ﬁndings, the District Court granted

its

found that

in favor

0f EIRMC and thereafter

did not need to consider any arguments or evidence presented by Dupuis concerning

it

the issue 0f Whether

address

summary judgment

EIRMC violated the

EIRMC’s motion to

duty of care

strike the opinions

R Vol.

based upon the District Court’s ruling.

owed to him

as an invitee nor did

it

need

t0

of Roland York, as that motion had become moot

5, p.

421.

Judgment dismissing Dupuis’ complaint, with prejudice, was entered 0n February 26,
2020.

C)

R V01.

5,

pp. 423-424.

Dupuis timely appealed

thereafter.

R V01.

5, pp.

433-436.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

Idaho area.

January 23, 2017, and January 24, 2017, a signiﬁcant snowstorm

R V01.

1,

hit the

Idaho

pp. 58 (Victor Dupuis Depo. pp. 82:17-25, 83:19 t0 84:5), 72 (Carol

Falls,

Dupuis

Depo. pp. 29:18 to 30:22), 74 (Carol Dupuis Depo. pp. 41 :24 to 42: 15), 106 (Noelle Dupuis Depo.
pp. 2921-23), 122-127, 132, 150-151, 169-170.

the evening 0f January 23, 2017, and early

Carol Dupuis (“Carol”), refused going t0
chest pain

symptoms because she was

morning hours 0f January 24, 2017,

R V01.

and 74 (Carol Dupuis Depo. pp. 41 :24

Depo.

82:17-25, 83:19 t0 84:5).

1,

pp. 71-72 (Carol

to

What she

to 42: 15), see also

Dupuis Depo. pp. 28:22

R V01.

1, p.

58 (Victor Dupuis

After the roads had been plowed sometime around 9:00 or

am. on the morning of January 24, 2017, Carol ﬁnally asked Dupuis to

emergency room

that Dupuis’ wife,

afraid of being transported t0 the hospital in

to 29: 14)

10:00

so severe during

EIRMC’S emergency room t0 be examined for signiﬁcant

described as the “absolute worst conditions.”

p.

The “blizzard” conditions were

have her severe chest pain symptoms diagnosed and

take her to

treated.

EIRMC’s

R Vol.

1,

pp. 58

(Victor Dupuis Depo. p. 84:10-20) and 73 (Carol Dupuis Depo. p. 3314-8). Dupuis remained With

Carol throughout that morning until she was admitted into the hospital in the early afternoon, after

which time he returned home.

R Vol.

1, p.

59 (Victor Dupuis Depo.

Respondent Brief - 4

p. 86: 1-25).

The certiﬁed weather data entered
establish that

it

snowed a

total

into the record

and the KIPI weather almanac date

of 3.0 inches on January 23, 2017, and a

January 24, 2017, in the Idaho Falls, Idaho area.

R Vol.

1,

total

0f 6.5 inches 0n

The KIPI

pp. 122-127 and 169-170.

weather almanac data for January 24, 2017, establishes that the amount of snowfall on that day

was a record

level in that area for that calendar date

and similarly establishes

snowfall in that area between the calendar dates of January
in that area in

2017

for the period

1

that the

and January 24 was

0f time between those calendar

R Vol.

dates.

at

amount of

record level

1, p.

170.

The

certiﬁed weather data also establishes that the temperature in the Idaho Falls, Idaho, area never got

above freezing

at

any time on

The speciﬁc temperature readings
material

t0

this

R V01.

1, p.

EIRMC’s snow removal

B&K

EIRMC’s

responded to

owner and

was
his

123.

at

pm. and

approximately 6:00

16°F by

contractor,

B&K,

kept regular business records of

R V01.

1, p.

150, at

[r

its

snow

These records establish

7.

approaching Winter storm by spreading 3,000

lbs.

of ice melt 0n

parking lots on January 23, 2017, and also brooming, shoveling, and ice melting

sidewalks 0n that date.

parking

this

1, p.

127.

removal work on ERIMC’S hospital premises.
that

R Vol.

in the Idaho Falls, Idaho area for January 24, 2017, at the times

action were respectively 23°F

approximately 8:00 p.m.

0n January 24, 2017.

either January 23, 2017, 0r

R V01.

1,

pp. 150-15 1

principal, testiﬁed that his

lots

and 172-175;

R V01. 2, p. 338.

purpose for spreading 3,000

lbs.

on January 23, 2017, before the snow had even accumulated

t0 help prevent the

snow from

crew arrived the next morning

winter storm.

R

to

getting

Brent Martin,

0f ice melt 0n
to

activities in

5

EIRMC’S

lot

before he and

response to the approaching

V01. 2, p. 245 (Brent Martin Depo. pp. 91:7 to 92:2).

Respondent Brief -

B&K’s

two inches on that day,

packed down on EIRMC’S parking

begin snow plowing

its

B&K’s

regularly kept

business records establishes that

employees continuously plowed

did, in fact, return the next

it

These business records also establish

on EIRMC’S parking
338. In

total,

that

B&K’s employees

R V01.

1,

and 150 (Sworn Declaration 0f Brent Martin,
activities until

remaining 0n

Martin Depo.

lots after the

p. 60:8—25);

plowing

at

[r

R V01.

lot

p. 19:9-16).

When

main

entrance.

pp. 150-151 and 172-175;

B&K’s

full

0f ice melt

R Vol.

2, p.

EIRMC’s

crew performed these snow
its

principal, Brent Martin,

R Vol.

had stopped for the day.

all

R Vol.

24, 2017,

Gordon

1,

snowing

1, p.

118 (Brent

t0 61:12).

activity stopped in the

1, at p.

The

Idaho

126.

Dupuis returned

to

EIRMC With his and

pp. 59 (Victor Dupuis Depo. p. 87:1-18) and

testiﬁed that he observed a

snowplow parked

in

they arrived that evening and that he also observed that there was not

R V01.

1,

p.

lot surfaces as

he and his father walked toward the

78 (Gordon Dupuis Depo. pp. 24: 14 t0 25:4). Gordon also

testiﬁed that he and his father recognized that the parking lot’s surface

therefore, that they both

R V01. 2,

6:00 p.m. in order t0 continue applying ice melt 0n

R V01.

any unplowed snow 0n EIRMC’S parking
hospital’s

and 172-175;

242-243 (Brent Martin Depo. pp. 60:15

2, pp.

Gordon Dupuis (“Gordon”).

parking

1,

7).

approximately 4:00 p.m. that day.

77 (Gordon Dupuis Depo.

EIRMC’s

pp. 150-15 1

pp. 113-1 14 (Brent Martin Depo. pp. 25:6 to 32:9)

activities

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on January
Carol’s son,

principal and

B&K spread an additional 3,000 lbs.

certiﬁed United States Weather Data establishes that

Falls, Idaho, area at

1,

approximately 5:00 p.m. that day; With

EIRMC’S hospital premises until

EIRMC’s parking

its

spent a combined 17 hours of snow removal activity on

premises on January 24, 2017, alone.

removal

R V01.

R Vol.

on January 24, 2017.

lots

that

EIRMCs parking lots and continuously broomed and shoveled its

sidewalks throughout the day 0n January 24, 2017.
p. 338.

morning and

walked slowly While crossing the parking

several times to wait for his father, Dupuis, because he

knew

Respondent Brief - 6

was

lot

slick that

and

that

that his father

evening and,

he even stopped

had more difﬁculty

walking 0n icy surfaces than he

R V01.

did.

1, p.

78 (Gordon Dupuis Depo. pp. 23:16-22, 25:5-

10)

When
testiﬁed:

This

asked

Why

“[W]e were making a Visit

Visit lasted until

t0 return

home

for the evening.

R V01.
p.

lot that

1,

R V01.

t0 their car,

1,

p.

at

59 (Victor Dupuis Depo.

Dupuis

p. 87:18).

which time Dupuis and Gordon left Carol’s room

59 (Victor Dupuis Depo.

p. 88: 12-16).

earlier,

with Gordon walking a short distance in

front.

Dupuis Depo. pp. 103210-15 and 105: 1 5-21), 78 (Gordon Dupuis Depo.

23:10-22) and 80 (Gordon Dupuis Depo. p. 34: 18-20). Notably, Dupuis testiﬁed that he did not

observe any changes in the parking

lot’s conditions as

from What he had observed When he had crossed
hours

earlier.

R V01.

did not observe

1, p.

that

he was returning to his car that evening

same

car.

R V01.

82 (Gordon Dupuis Depo.

through the parking

lot,

lot t0 enter the hospital a

couple of

61 (Victor Dupuis Depo. p. 103210-15). Dupuis also testiﬁed that he

Gordon having any problems negotiating

0n their way back t0 the
p.

1, p.

that evening,

Dupuis and Gordon took the same path through EIRMC’S

they had traversed two hours

pp. 61-62 (Victor

EIRMC’S premises

my Wife.” R V01.

t0

approximately 8:00 p.m.,

While returning
parking

he and his son had returned to

p.

way

62 (Victor Dupuis Depo.

44:14-17).

p.

Dupuis

1,

his

through

EIRMC’S

p. 10522-12);

Yet, While following in Gordon’s

slipped-and-fell.

R V01.

1,

pp. 61-62 (Victor

parking

see also

R V01

lot

1,

same exact path

Dupuis Depo. pp.

102:5 t0 106216) and 82 (Gordon Dupuis Depo. p. 44:14-17).

Who

Three unidentiﬁed individuals
that evening

V01.

1,

observed Dupuis lying 0n the parking

pp. 62-63 (Victor

Dupuis Depo. pp. 106:20

35:24 t0 37:7, 4324-15). Minutes

Dupuis

followed Dupuis out 0f the hospital’s main entrance

into a wheelchair

later,

lot

and immediately notiﬁed hospital

to 111124)

R

and 80 (Gordon Dupuis Depo. pp.

EIRMC personnel arrived 0n the

and thereafter immediately transported him

Respondent Brief - 7

staff.

scene and carefully lifted

t0

EIRMC’S emergency

room

for care

R

and treatment.

V01.

1,

pp. 63-65 (Victor

Dupuis Depo. pp. 111222

to 113:12,

116:22 to 117:13, 118:4 t0 120:19), 81-82 (Gordon Dupuis Depo. pp. 38:10 to 42:1) and 87-88

(Spencer Steel Depo. pp. 19:10 to 20:25 and 21 :7 to 22:10).

Upon examination it was determined that Dupuis had fractured his left hip and he thereafter
had a successful
injury.

R V01.

left total

1, p.

hip arthroplasty surgery performed on January 26, 2017 to repair his

96.

II.

1.

Whether the

ISSUES

ON APPEAL

District Court correctly applied Idaho

sole duty of care t0

Dupuis arose

law When

it

found that EIRMC’S

it

found that Dupuis was

in premises liability?

2.

Whether the District Court correctly applied Idaho law when
a licensee upon EIRMC’s premises at the time 0f his fall?

3.

Whether the District Court appropriately granted summary judgment
ﬁnding that there were no material disputed facts?
III.

in this case

by

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho appellate courts exercise de nova review 0f Rule 56 grants of summary judgment.

A&B Irrigation Dist.,

Paslay

v.

Invest,

LLC, 155 Idaho

same

162 Idaho 866, 868, 406 P.3d 878, 880 (2017); AED, Ind.

v.

159, 163, 307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013). Hence, the “standard ofreview

as the standard used

by

the trial court in ruling

on the motion

for

KDC
is

the

summary judgment.”

Stonebrook C0nst., LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 929, 277 P.3d 374, 376 (2012); see also Van

v.

Portneuf

Med. Cm, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009).

Summary judgment

is

appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on ﬁle,

together with the afﬁdavits, if any,

the

is

moving party

is

is

no genuine

entitled t0 a judgment as a matter

on the moving party

Household Finance

show that there

t0 demonstrate the absence

C019,,

issue as t0

any material

fact

and that

0f law.” I.R.C.P. 56(0). The burden 0f proof

0f a genuine issue 0f material

144 Idaho 68, 70, 156 P.3d 569, 571 (2007)
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(Citing

Evans

v.

fact.

Rouse

v.

Griswold, 129

“Once

Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 (1997)).
genuine issue of material

showing there

is

fact,

the burden shifts to the

a genuine issue for

(2007) (citing Hez'

trial.

party.

non-moving

establishes the absence 0f a

party,” t0 provide speciﬁc facts

Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 864

v.

Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003)).

v.

In construing the facts, the court

non-moving

Kiebert

moving party

the

Mackay

v.

must draw

Four Rivers Packing

all

reasonable factual inference in favor of the

C0., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064,

(2008). If reasonable people can reach different conclusions as t0 the facts, then the motion

Vincent

denied.

v.

Safeco

Ins. C0.

The non-moving
scintilla

fact for trial.

(1996);

party’s case

of evidence 0r only a

AED,

Zimmerman
Inc.

v.

v.

must be

ofAmerica, 136 Idaho 107, 109, 29 P.3d 943, 945 (2001)

Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878

slight

must be anchored

(Citing

(1991)).

something more than speculation; a mere

in

doubt as to the facts

1066

is

not enough t0 create a genuine issue 0f

Volkswagon ofAmerica, Ina, 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69

KDC Investments,

LLC, 155 Idaho

307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013). “The

159, 163,

absence of a genuine issue of fact with regard to an essential element of the plaintiff s claim renders

any other potential issues of

fact irrelevant.”

Holdaway

610, 349 P.3d 1197, 1201 (2015) (citing Bromley

non-moving party

v.

v.

Broulim

’s

Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606,

Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 810-1

1,

979 P.2d 1165,

1168-69 (1999).

“[I]f the

essential elements

0f his or her case, judgment shall be granted t0 the moving party.” Porter

Bassett, 146 Idaho 399,

fails to

provide a sufﬁcient showing to establish the

403, 195 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2008) (citing

Atwood v.

v.

Smith, 143 Idaho 110,

113, 138 P.3d 310, 313 (2006)).

Appellate courts exercise “free review in determining Whether a genuine issue of material

fact exists

and Whether the prevailing party was

entitled t0

judgment

City ofElkRiver, 144 Idaho 337, 338, 160 P.3d 1272, 1273 (2007).
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as a matter 0f law.”

Doe

v.

IV.

The

application of Idaho’s well-established case law to the undisputed material facts of this

case establishes

(A) the District Court correctly applied Idaho law in ﬁnding that

that:

duty 0f care to Dupuis arose in premises
in

ARGUMENT

liability;

EIRMC’S

sole

(B) The District Court correctly applied Idaho law

ﬁnding that Dupuis was a licensee on EIRMC’ s premises

Court appropriately granted summary judgment in

at the

this case

time 0f his

fall;

and, (C) the District

because there are n0 material disputed

facts.

A)

The

care t0

The

Court correctly applied Idaho law
Dupuis arose in premises liability.

District

The

Court correctly answered that question When

District

Idaho’s well-established premises liability laws governed

R V01.

the facts of this case.

Court should ﬁnd

appeal; (2)

EIRMC

417.

5, at p.

that: (1)

Dupuis

is

EIRMC’S

Dupuis

found that

EIRMC’S Snow

B&K did not establish an afﬁrmative duty 0n EIRMC for Dupuis.
is

not allowed t0 raise legal issues for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal.
that a duty should

203 -205 (making n0 balancing of the harm argument

summary judgment); and Tr
citing

EIRMC’S

not allowed to raise legal issues for the ﬁrst time on

be imposed upon

through a balancing of harm analysis. Compare, Appellant’s Brief at pp. 24-26, with,

argument and

it

duty 0f

In afﬁrming the District Court’s ruling 0n this issue,

For the ﬁrst time on appeal Dupuis argues

for

sole

duty 0f care t0 Dupuis under

did not assume an afﬁrmative duty of care to Dupuis; and (3)

Removal Contract With
1)

ﬁnding that EIRMC’s

Court was presented With the question of which source imposed

District

duty 0f care t0 Dupuis.

this

in

n0

V01.

legal authority

1,

in his written opposition t0

pp. 19:17 t0 24:7)

on

EIRMC

R V01.

1,

pp.

EIRMC’S motion

(making no balancing of the harm

that issue during oral arguments).

Dupuis makes

his

balancing 0f harm analysis argument not only in Section 3(A)(iii) 0f his Opening Brief but also in
Section 1(B) where he request, for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, that a
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new

rule should be adopted in

Idaho for hospital premises based upon public policy considerations. In the proceedings below,

Dupuis never requested

upon public policy

that the district court adopt a

considerations.

203 -205 (making no request

that a

public policy considerations);

that a

new rule be adopted

new rule be adopted

e.g.,

1,

pp.

EIRMC’s motion

at pp. 15-16, with,

R V01.

in Idaho for hospital premises

it

19:17 t0 24:7) (making n0 public policy

for

summary judgment and making n0

Bell

v.

it

Idaho Dept. ofLabor, 157 Idaho 744, 749, 339 P.3d 1148, 1153

0n

appeal).

premises With the District Court, he cannot raise such arguments
either 0f these issues as

deﬁned

in

1))

(ﬁnding

Because Dupuis failed

of harm argument and his request for the adoption of a

no ﬁnal judgment on

request

“will not consider issues that are raised for the ﬁrst

will not consider the issue raised for the ﬁrst time

raise his balancing

pp.

based upon

(2014) (citing Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, 941, 265 P.3d 1144, 1153 (201
that

1,

in Idaho for Idaho premises).

This Court has consistently held that

time 0n appeal.” See,

arbitrary rule for hospital Visitors based

Compare, Appellant’s Brief

and Tr V01.

arguments during the hearing on

new

now on

new

t0

rule for hospital

appeal. Indeed, there

is

Rule 54(a) 0f the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure, Which would entitle Dupuis t0 an appeal. See I.R.A.P. 11(a)(1) (dictating that a party
is

entitled t0

deﬁned

in

an appeal “as a matter 0f right” in

civil actions

only

if there is

a ﬁnal judgment as

Rule 54(a)). Without a ﬁnal judgment from the District Court on either of these

Dupuis has n0

right t0

have these issue

Based upon the foregoing,

this

now

issues,

considered for the ﬁrst time on appeal. Id.

Court should decline t0 hear Dupuis’ balancing of harm

arguments and further decline to consider Dupuis’ request for a

new

because both of these issues have been raised for the ﬁrst time 0n

this appeal.
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rule for hospital premises

2)

EIRMC

“There

is

did not assume an afﬁrmative duty of care to Dupuis.

ordinarily

no afﬁrmative duty

t0 act or assist or protect another absent unusual

circumstances Which justify imposing such an afﬁrmative responsibility.” Coghlan
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399,

in

based 0n an undertaking.” Beers

to another: a special relationship 0r

an assumed duty

Comomz‘ion ofPresident ofChurch ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day

v.

Idaho 680, 686, 316 P.3d 92, 98 (2013).

In this case, Dupuis concedes that there

is

n0

special relationship

himself. See Appellant’s Brief, at p. 20. Therefore, the only other

that

Beta Theta Pi

987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). “Idaho law recognizes two circumstances

which a person has an afﬁrmative duty of care

Saints, 155

v.

EIRMC

assumed an afﬁrmative duty 0f care

supports a ﬁnding that

EIRMC

for

him

is t0

undertaking induced Dupuis t0 rely

EIRMC t0

EIRMC

way Dupuis can establish

and

a claim

point t0 evidence in the record that

voluntarily performed an act that

perform, and t0 also point t0 evidence demonstrating that

between

it

was not otherwise obligated

ERIMC’S performance of

to

the alleged

continue t0 perform the action. Beers, 155 Idaho at

687, 316 P.3d at 99 (summarizing the reasoning behind the Baccus Court’s decision

was

that

“by

undertaking t0 place the safety mats which induced reliance bV those in the building Where the
accident occurred, the defendant had assumed a duty by undertaking to perform the action.” (emphasis
added)). There

First

it

is

no such evidence

and foremost, there

was not otherwise obligated

is

in this case.

n0 evidence

t0 perform.

in this case

Dupuis’ pointing to

parking lots as an alleged voluntary undertaking of a

fails t0

recognize that there

premises, to inspect

liability law, the

its

is

EIRMC undertook t0 perform an act that

new

EIRMC’s

periodic inspections of its

afﬁrmative duty

is

misguided because he

already an existing duty imposed on EIRMC, as the owner of its hospital

premises for the beneﬁt 0f its licensees.

To be

clear,

under Idaho’s premises

element 0f duty owed by a property owner depends 0n the status 0f the injured person
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in relation to the property owner,

Riverbend Communications, 2020
invitees, a property

i.e.,

invitee, licensee (social guest), or trespasser.

WL 4432815,

*5 (August

in inspection

IDJI 3.1

Id. (citing

v.

AS

t0

2020) (citations omitted).

3,

owner “owes a duty t0 exercise ordinary care

purpose of discovering dangerous conditions.”
law, there

at

Packer

1).

0f the premises for the

Under Idaho’s premises liability

not similar duty imposed on property owners t0 inspect their premises for the beneﬁt of

is

any licenses 0r trespassers 0n

their premises.

See, e.g. Keller

v.

Holiday Inns, Inc, 105 Idaho 649,

652, 671 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Id App. 1983) (not identifying a duty t0 inspect as one of the duties

by a property owner

to

an

Peterson

invitee); and,

v.

owed

Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266,

1269 (1998) (not identifying a duty to inspect as one of the duties owed by a property owner t0 a
trespasser).

The
inspected

fact that there is

its

surprising.

evidence in

premises in fulﬁlment of the duty

The

fact that

it

inspected

its

EIRMC,

this case that

it

already

premises for

its

owed

as a property owner, periodically

t0 invitees

0n

licensees does not

its

premises

is

mean, however,

not

that

EIRMC afﬁrmatively assumed a duty to also conduct such inspections for any licensee or trespassers
0n

its

premises. See,

person fulﬁlls

its

e.g.,

Beers, 155 Idaho at 687, 316 P.3d at 99 (recognizing that just because a

legal duty to

one party does not mean that

perform the same act thereafter for the beneﬁt of other
is

ludicrous because

it

it

has assumed an afﬁrmative duty t0

parties).

In this regard Dupuis’ argument

runs directly contrary to Idaho’s well-established premises liability laws

Which does not impose a duty 0n property owners to reasonably inspect their premises

for licensees

0r trespassers.

Because
case

is

EIRMC

already had an existing duty to inspect

dissimilar to the case presented to the Court in

346, 350, 179 P.3d 309, 313 (2008).

Baccus

v.

its

premises for

Ameripride

its

invitees, this

Servs., Inc.

,

145 Idaho

In Baccus, the plaintiff brought a personal injury action
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against AmeriPride, a corporation that her property

owner employer, Bechtel, had hired t0, among

other things, place safety mats at the entrances of its ofﬁce building for the beneﬁt of its employees.

The employee-plaintiff in Baccus,

fell

near an entrance in Betchel’s building Where n0 safety mat

had been placed by AmeriPride. Bacccus, 145 Idaho
In reaching

its

at

348, 179 P.3d at 3

1 1.

decision in Baccus, this Court recognized several signiﬁcant facts that

its

decision that AmeriPride had assumed an afﬁrmative duty 0f care for the employee-

plaintiff: (1)

AmeriPride owed no duty of care for those 0n Bechtel’s premises and, therefore,

supported

without the express contractual assumption of a duty by AmeriPride,

0f care t0 the employee-plaintiff; and,
building, the employee-plaintiff

it

would have owed n0 duty

an employee regularly working in Bechtel’s ofﬁce

(2) as

was aware

that safety

entrances and, therefore, she reasonably relied

mats were kept inside the building’s

upon AmeriPride

fulﬁlling

its

contractual duty to

ensure that there were mats appropriately located in those entrances. Id. at 352, 179 P.3d at 3 15.

Unlike the facts in Baccus,
existing duties of care for those

already

owed

EIRMC,

as the

owner 0f the premises

at issue,

already had

on its premises, including but not limited to Dupuis. Since

EIRMC

a duty of care t0 Dupuis, the assumption of duty doctrine in Baccus does not apply

to this case.

Also distinguishable from Baccus

was induced

to rely

because there

and

ice

is

is

the fact that Dupuis has provided

upon EIRMC’s snow and

no evidence

in this case that

ice

removal policies or upon

its

that

he

inspection policies

he even knew 0f EIRMC’S policies related t0 snow

removal in the hospital’s parking area 0r

inspection practices for

its

n0 evidence

that

he knew or otherwise was aware 0f

its

parking area. Whereas in Baccus, the employee-plaintiff proved that

he was regularly 0n the subject premises because

it

was

evidence in the record 0f Dupuis ever having been on

his place 0f

employment, there

EIRMC’S premises
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is

no

prior to January 24,

2017.

Similarly, there

is

no evidence

in the record

0f Dupuis ever having observed an

employee inspecting the hospital’s sidewalks and parking area
Notably, there

is

lot’s slippery

action be taken to alleviate the condition,

EIRMC was

condition

when

Without Dupuis having reported the condition to

earlier that evening.

some

any time material hereto.

at

not even any evidence in the record that Dupuis or his son, Gordon, complained

employee about the parking

t0 a hospital

EIRMC

it

they entered the hospital

EIRMC and requesting that

was not reasonable

for

Dupuis

t0

assume

that

going to take some afﬁrmative action to alleviate the condition during the two hours

he was in the hospital. In the absence of any of the above-type 0f evidence, there was nothing

upon which
Dupuis

t0 rely

6:00 p.m.,

it

the District Court could

upon

when he

it

ﬁrst crossed that lot t0 enter the hospital,

induce Dupuis t0 rely upon

EIRMC

a reasonable ﬁnding in this case that

to inspect 0r otherwise alleviate the condition

once again to return t0 his

that

make

it

t0

parking

that

EIRMC

lot

induced

between

started across

did anything t0

perform an afﬁrmative action 0n his behalf, there can be no ﬁnding

assumed an afﬁrmative duty 0f care

Because Dupuis has

its

and 8:00 p.m., When he

Without any evidence showing

car.

0f

EIRMC

t0

Dupuis

in this case.

failed to present evidence in support

0f either element 0f an afﬁrmative

assumption 0f duty 0n the part 0f EIRMC, the District Court correctly determined in

this case that

EIRMC’s duty to Dupuis was not based upon an assumption of duty but rather arose under Idaho’s
premises

liability law.

conclusion,

its

ruling

Because the District Court correctly applied Idaho’s law in reaching

0n

this issue

should be afﬁrmed by this Court 0n appeal.

EIRMC’s Snow Removal Agreement With

3)

afﬁrmative duty on
It is

EIRMC’s

EIRMC

B&K

t0 carry out all

sidewalks and parking

snow removal

lot area.

B&K did not establish an

for Dupuis.

undisputed in this case that in January 2017,

that required

this

R V01.

B&K and EIRMC had a contract in place

services and all application of ice melt

1, at

pp. 148-151.
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A

0n

copy 0f the controlling

Snow Removal Agreement
agreement conﬁrms that

is

found in the record

premises, Which included but

snow and

ice

R Vol.

removal services were

1, at

pp. 148-151.

to

EIRMC

snow and

ice

pp. 154-167.

1,

removal

limited t0

be performed.

it

B&K

R V01.

addendum concerning

to expect.”

R V01.

1, p.

t0

pay

0n

its

167;

R V01.

and

264. Based

2, p.

on EIRMC’S premises 0n January 24, 2017.

its

sole obligation

facts

for

EIRMC

any snow 0r

ice

did not

removal

under the terms of this agreement was simply

0f this case invite a comparison to the facts that were before

an afﬁrmative duty 0n the part of EIRMC

compared t0 the

facts

0f that case

it

most closely resembles the defendant
resembles the Baccus defendant.

owner of the

becomes

For instance,

misguided.

Rather

like the

B&K

is

that decision t0 try

When the

0f this case

EIRMC is not the entity that
the entity that

defendant in that case

owed n0 duty 0f care

facts

to

most closely

B&K

is

Dupuis 0r anyone

not the

else

0n

without the express contractual assumption of a duty to perform the snow and

removal work on EIRMC’S premises. Also

in fact, undertake t0

is

readily apparent that

in Baccus.

subject premises and, therefore,

EIRMC’s premises
ice

level of workmanship

Baccus Court. Such comparison demonstrates why Dupuis’ reliance upon

t0 establish

are

the application of ice melt,

B&K for these snow and ice removal services.
The undisputed material

the

and 166-167; see

B&K is the entity who assumed the duty of care for performing

activities

premises. Rather,

When and how such

pp. 154-55

1, at

assume any duties under the terms of this Snow Removal Agreement
activities

A plain reading of that

deciding

would receive “the same high

come

[had]

upon this uncontroverted evidence,
the

was not

Indeed, in the

B&K even guaranteed t0 EIRMC that
professionalism that

Vol.

B&K assumed full responsibility for snow and ice removal activities on

EIRMC’s

also

at

like the

defendant in Baccus,

B&K in this case did,

perform the snow and ice removal work 0n EIRMC’S premises. As

found with the defendant in Baccus, once

B&K undertook to perform this
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service

this

Court

on EIRMC’S

premises,

Idaho

B&K was under a duty t0 perform

such service in non—negligent manner. Baccus, 145

350, 179 P.3d at 313; see also Beers, 155 Idaho at 687, 316 P.3d at 99 (ﬁnding that once

at

a party voluntarily undertakes a duty of care, the party

obligated t0 perform

is

responsibilities

its

in a “non-negligent manner”).

In sum, if Dupuis wished t0 pursue recovery in this case under a theory 0f an assumption

0f duty doctrine as articulated by
not.

As

to

this

EIRMC, whom Dupuis

Court in Baccus, then he should have sued

did sue, the District Court correctly found that

0f care to Dupuis arose because under Idaho’s premises
Court correctly applied Idaho law and, therefore,

its

liability laws.

ruling

0n this

B&K. He
EIRMC’S

did

duty

In so ﬁnding, the District

issue should be

afﬁrmed by this

Court 0n appeal.

B)

The

District

Court correctly applied Idaho law

0n EIRMC’s premises

at the

Upon

EIRMC’S duty of

determining that

liability law, the District

EIRMC’s premises
District Court’s

at the

time of his injury.

care for Dupuis arose under Idaho’s premises

R V01.

ﬁnding that Dupuis was a licensee
this issue

ﬁnding that Dupuis was a licensee

fall.

Court correctly perceived that

Court correctly perceived that
liability

time 0f his

in

it

next had t0 determine Dupuis’ status 0n

5, at p.

at the

417.

This Court should afﬁrm the

time ofhis injury because: (1) The District

could be resolved based upon Idaho’s existing premises

laws and also correctly applied such law to the undisputed material facts of this case; and

(2) adopting the overbroad, arbitrary rule requested

by Dupuis

would have negative unintended consequences on Idaho’s
1)

is

not supported by the record and

existing premises liability laws.

The District Court correctly perceived that this issue could be resolved based
upon Idaho’s existing premises liability laws and also correctly applied such
law t0 the undisputed material

facts 0f this case.

Under Idaho’s well-established law, “[W]hen a negligence cause of
premises

liability, the

action

is

based 0n

element 0f duty depends on the status 0f the injured person in relation to the
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landowners,

i.e.,

invitee, licensee (social guest), or trespasser.”

Idaho 22, 28, 423 P.3d 443, 449 (citing Shea

v.

Brooks

v.

Wal—Mart Stores,

Inc.

,

164

Kevic Corp, 156 Idaho 540, 328 P.3d 520 (2014)).

After acknowledging that Idaho’s appellate courts had not previously addressed this speciﬁc
issue,1 the District

Court correctly perceived that the most appropriate

legal issue of Dupuis’ status

liability

law

t0 the speciﬁc facts

Packer, 2020

1112 (Id

App

of

this case, just as Idaho’s appellate courts

WL 4432815, at *5, and, Keller

1983), reversed

approach of addressing

for

it

to resolve the

0n EIRMC’S property was to apply Idaho’s well-established premises

Compare

presented With this legal issues in countless other cases.

e.g.,

way

v.

R V01.

pp. 418-19, with,

Holiday Inns, Ina, 105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d

0n other grounds. This Court should ﬁnd

this legal issue

5, at

have done When

by applying Idaho’s

that the District Court’s

existing premises liability

law was the

correct approach to take as opposed t0 accepting Dupuis’ invitation 0f looking to see

states

have addressed

The

how

other

this issue.

relevant facts showing Dupuis’ status 0n the land are not in dispute. Indeed, Dupuis’

counsel conceded such during oral arguments. Tr V01.

1,

pp. 21:21 to 22:25.

Because there was no

material dispute of fact 0n this issue, the District Court could determine Dupuis’ status as a matter

of law When ruling on EIRMC’s motion for summary judgment. I.R.C.P. 56(a).

1

A review of this Courts earlier decisions in Robertson

Center, 117 Idaho 979, 793 P.2d 211 (1990) and Bates

v.
v.

Magic

Valley Regional Medical

Eastern Idaho Regional Medical

Why it was simply assumed by
were invitees upon their premises. In both
cases, the defendants were seeking to avail themselves 0f the now abrogated open and obvious
danger defense and, in the case ofRobertson, the defendant was also seeking t0 shield itself from
liability based upon the now abrogated natural accumulation of snow and ice defense. See,
generally Robertson v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 117 Idaho 979, 793 P.2d 211
(1990), and Bates v. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center, 14 Idaho 252, 755 P.2d 1290
(1988). The fact that those defendants strategically decided under the facts 0f those cases t0
focus their defense on those now abrogated doctrines does not support a ﬁnding under the facts
0f this case that all Visitors to a hospital should therefore be classiﬁed as invitees.
Center, 14 Idaho 252, 755 P.2d 1290 (1988) readily demonstrates

the defendants in those cases that the Visitor-plaintiffs
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To

that end, the District

Court ﬁrst looked

under Idaho’s existing premises

liability case law.

enters

upon

deﬁnitions 0f an invitee and a licensee

R Vol.

it

can reasonably be said that the

Visit

418.

“An

may confer a business,

0r other tangible beneﬁt to the landowner.” Packer, 2020

v.

1, at p.

Who goes upon the premises of another With the
purpose.” Id.

“A

social guest is a licensee

Holzheimer, 125 Idaho

at

WL 4432815, at *5 (citing Holzheimer

a guest

“Where

the purpose 0fthe Visit

is social,

P.2d 341, 347 (1959); and, Citing

“Nor

common

rendering

3.15.2; see

rendering a minor, incidental service to the host does not change the relationship

[between them as a landowner and a licensee]”) (quoting Wilson

or

a Visitor

City ofBlaclgroot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (ﬁnding that the “fact that

may be

(1970)).

is

the premises 0f his host.” IDJI 3.15.2; see also

minor incidental services or economic beneﬁt does not change the relationship.” IDJI
v.

0n the

consent of the landowner in pursuit ofthe Visitor’s

upon

400, 871 P.2d at 817.

who

commercial, monetary,

Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871 P.2d 814, 817 (1994)). Whereas, “[a] licensee

also, Ball

one

invitee is

the premises of another for a purpose connected With the business conducted

Where

land, 0r

at the

is

Mooney

the relationship changed

interest in the

purpose 0f the

v.

v.

Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347

Robinson, 93 Idaho 676, 678-79, 471 P.2d 63, 65-66

by the
Visit,

fact that the guest

and the host may have a mutual

such as the service 0f a church, lodge, 0r political

purpose, or an intangible social beneﬁt to the host.” Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d at 347.

The

best evidence of Dupuis’ purpose for being on

January 24, 2017,
wife.”

0n

R V01.

1, p.

is

his

own sworn

testimony Where he

59 (Victor Dupuis Depo.

p. 87:

1

8).

EIRMCS

states:

premises 0n the evening of

“[W]e were making a

Visit to

my

Dupuis has never modiﬁed 0r equivocated

this testimony.

Based upon this straightforward and uncontested evidence, the
found:
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District

Court appropriately

There

is

n0 dispute

in the record that the reason

Dupuis was

at

EIRMC that day

was to Visit his Wife. He was not admitted into EIRMC for any reason and he
was not being treated by EIRMC for any condition. The Court is not persuaded
by Dupuis’ argument that by Visiting his Wife, it could reasonably be said that
he was conferring a business, commercial, monetary, or other tangible beneﬁt t0
EIRMC or that he personally was there for a purpose connected with EIRMC’S
business. He was there for his Wife and not for EIRMC 0r EIRMC’S business.

R Vol.
EIRMC may

5, p.

418.

Based upon Idaho’s premises

have had a mutual 0r

common

liability laws, the

interest in the

purpose 0f his

mere

fact

Visit that

Dupuis and

evening

(i.e.,

Carol’s well-being) does not change the relationship of these parties. Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347

P.2d

at

347.

Dupuis’

at

Visit

Nor does any minor,

incidental, 0r intangible

beneﬁt

EIRMC may have derived from

With Carol change Dupuis” status from that of a licensee t0 an invitee. Ball, 152 Idaho

677, 273 P.3d at 1270; and, Mooney, 93 Idaho at 678, 471 P.2d at 65.

Unlike the facts presented before

this

Court in

Communications, LLC, Docket N0. 46964, 2020
Court’s

Memorandum

its

WL

recent decision in Packer

4432815 (August

3,

v.

Riverbend

2020), the District

Decision in the present case reveals that the District Court recognized and

considered that there were two alternative ways in which a person could be classiﬁed as an invitee.
Indeed, in

its

summation of

relevant t0 both alternative

Most

facts

on

this issue the District

Court identiﬁed ﬁndings that were

ways Dupuis could be classiﬁed

as an invitee at the time of his

importantly, the District Court’s holding demonstrates that

for being classiﬁed as an invitee:

his Wife,

it

it

fall.

understood both alternatives

“The Court is not persuaded by Dupuis’ argument that by Visiting

could reasonably be said he was conferring a business, commercial, monetary, 0r other

tangible beneﬁt to

EIRMC g that he personally was there for a purpose connected with EIRMC’S

business.” See, e.g.

R V01.

District Court’s decision

5, at p.

shows

establishing the differences

418 (emphasis added». Therefore, the plain language 0f the

that the District

Court properly understood and applied the law

between an invitee and a

licensee.
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Although the

District Court’s

Memorandum

purpose of EIRMC operating a hospital 0n

its

Decision

premises,

its

is

succinct in

the parties and, therefore,

at pp.

was never

§

is

it

understood

A review of the pleadings

demonstrate that this purpose was not

at issue

in dispute before the District Court. See, generally

46-47 and 205-207; see also Tr V01.

hospital

Code

district court

ﬁndings as t0 the

ﬁndings demonstrate that

EIRMC’ s purpose was t0 provide medical services t0 the sick or injured.
and oral arguments before the

its

1, at

pp. 15: 16 t0 23:18

between

R Vol.

1,

Finding that the purpose of a

t0 provide medical services t0 the sick 0r injured is reasonable considering that Idaho

39-1301(a)(1) deﬁnes a licensed hospital in Idaho as a facility that

in providing,

by

is

“primarily engaged

0r under the supervision of physicians, (a) concentrated medical and nursing care

on a twenty-four (24) hour bases

t0 inpatients experiencing acute illness;

and

(b) diagnostic

and

therapeutic services for medical diagnosis and treatment, psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, and

care 0f injured, disabled, or sick persons; and (3) rehabilitation services for injured, disabled, or
sick persons;

that

and

(4) obstetrical care.” I.C. § 39-1301(a)(1).

were brought before

found in

this case that

EIRMC’S

business.

it

and in consideration of LC.

Based upon the record and arguments

§ 39- 1 30 1 (a)(l), the District

Court correctly

Dupuis was not 0n EIRMC’s premises for a purpose connected With

After concluding that the evidence did not support a ﬁnding that Dupuis was on

premises for a purpose connected to
the record t0 see if there

EIRMC’S business,

was any evidence

418.

The

the District Court appropriately looked t0

establishing that Dupuis’ Visit conferred a “business,

commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit” to
5, at p.

EIRMC’S

EIRMC While he was

on

its

premises.

District Court’s determination that Dupuis’ Visit did not confer

commercial, monetary or other tangible beneﬁt” to

Dupuis made no arguments and presented no

EIRMC

is

R Vol.

any “business,

not an issue in this appeal because

legal authority in his opening brief challenging the
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District Court’s decision

0n

this

speciﬁc issue.

See, generally Appellant’s Brief, at pp. 12-14.

Idaho’s appellate courts will not consider an issue on appeal that

and authority

in the

opening brief.” Bach

(2010) (citing Jorgensen

v.

v.

not “supported by argument

is

Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152

Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008)).

Finding n0 evidence in the record that courld support either alternative for classifying

Dupuis as an invitee 0n EIRMC’S premises, the

Dupuis was, as a matter 0f law, a licensee 0n EIRMC’S premises
at p. 419.

concluded in this case that

District Court correctly

at the

time of his

fall.

R V01

5,

In so concluding, the District Court observed:

.

.

.

[P]ermitting Visitors

0n the premises not
because

EIRMC

not the equivalent of inviting Visitors. Dupuis

is

for the purpose of conferring a

permitted

contrast to an invitee, there

premises.

was

beneﬁt 0n EIRMC, but

him t0 enter the premises t0 Visit a
was n0 general invitation for Dupuis

patient.

In

t0 enter the

Had Dupuis decided t0 tour the facility on his own he likely would be

considered a trespasser. His permission t0 be 0n the premises was qualiﬁed and
limited t0 Visiting a patient.

It is

the Court’s opinion that the facts of this matter

create a licensee status akin t0 a social guest.

R V01.

5, at p.

419.

The Court’s reasoning and conclusion 0n

this issue is consistent

with

Idaho’s well-established premises liability law and, therefore, should be afﬁrmed by this Court on
appeal.

Indeed, applying Idaho’s premises liability law t0

ﬁnd

that

Dupuis was a licensee under

the extremely limited facts 0f this case as opposed to this Court’s recent holding in Packer,

it

concluded the plaintiff was an

demonstrate

0f legal

how

issues.

application of

The

contrast

invitee, provides this

its

premises

liability

where

Court With a unique opportunity t0 clearly

jurisprudence can easily resolve these types

between these two cases

is striking.

In Packer this Court

was

presented With direct evidence establishing that the defendant’s purpose in renting the commercial

space was t0 sublease booth space 0n the premises t0 third-party vendors, such as the
Further, the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff

had conferred a

Respondent Brief - 22

direct

plaintiff.

economic beneﬁt on

the defendant

2020

When

she paid for her booth space occupied by her on the date 0f her injury. Packer,

WL 4432815 at **1-2, and *5

There

In the present case, the purpose of

services t0 those

who

no similar evidence

is

are sick 0r injured.

EIRMC was shown

in this case.

t0

Dupuis has provided n0 evidence challenging

premise. Dupuis failed t0 provide any evidence that, as a Visitor, he
healing the sick 0r injured.

Even making

be the provision 0f medical

was

the reasonable inference that Dupuis

seeing his Wife healed does not equate t0 an inference that his presence
Instead, the evidence

Similarly,

shows

that his

there to assist

purpose was to socialize with

Dupuis has provided n0 evidence establishing

was

was

this

EIRMC

in

interested in

furthering that goal.

this wife.

that his Visit

0n the evening of

January 24, 2017, conferred any business, commercial, monetary or any other type of tangible

beneﬁt

t0

EIRMC.

Instead, he has

conceded through his opening brief on appeal that his

Visit

provided n0 such beneﬁt.

A
facts that

comparison 0f these two cases demonstrates that the

were before

this

fall.

Because the

this case, its

ﬁnding

was a

licensee

District Court understood Idaho’s

that

of this case are not

like the

Court in Packer. Based upon the undisputed material facts 0f this case,

the District Court correctly found that Dupuis

his

facts

Dupuis was a licensee

at the

on EIRMC’S premises

law and correctly applied

time 0f this

fall

it

at the

time of

t0 the facts

of

should be afﬁrmed by this

Court on appeal.
2)

Adopting the overbroad, arbitrary rule requested by Dupuis
by the record.

Although

EIRMC takes the position in this

the District Court and, therefore,

it is

is

not supported

case that Dupuis did not raise this issue before

not an appropriate issue t0 be decided on appeal,

however, brieﬂy address the overbroad, arbitrary rule that Dupuis has asked

Respondent Brief - 23

this

it

will,

Court t0 adopt.

It is

clear

from

his brieﬁng

upon Idaho’s

his legal status based

this

that

Dupuis does not Wish for this Court

existing premises liability laws.

Instead,

t0 determine

Dupuis has invited

Court t0 adopt a new overbroad, arbitrary rule in Idaho that anyone “Visiting a family member,

friend, or other loved

0f the

facts

t0 adopt

the

0n appeal

is

of the case. Appellant’s Brief,

new rules

new

one in the hospital

t0

be considered an invitee” 0f the hospital regardless

When

at p. 15.

in the premises liability context, this

rule bears the

Court has been invited in the past

this

Court has found that the party requesting

burden 0f presenting the Court With compelling public policy evidence

supporting the adoption 0f such

recommended

rule.

See, e.g.

Rountree

v.

Boise Baseball, LLC,

154 Idaho 167, 173, 296 P.3d 373, 379 (declining to adopt the baseball rule because the plaintiff
did not supply the court With evidence supporting the adoption 0f the special rule).
In this case, Dupuis has failed t0 present this Court with the type of evidence the Court

could reasonably rely upon in adopting a

new rule with

regard to hospitals. For instance, Dupuis

has not presented the Court With evidence establishing that hospital Visitors are frequently injured
in Idaho.

Id.

(looking to see whether the party requesting the

concerning the frequency of injury).

Nor has he presented

new

rule

had provided evidence

the Court With any statistical data

regarding the prevalence of hospital Visitors being injured in Idaho.

Id.

He

further has not

presented the Court with evidence supporting what reasonable changes would be necessary to

prevent the type of injury in the future. Id. In the void of any evidence that could support a public
policy need for change, adopting a

guesswork, which

this

new arbitrary rule

Court has previously held

the absence of actual evidence supporting the

is

new

for hospitals in Idaho

would simply become

an inappropriate function of the courts.
for a

new

rule based

upon public

made

Id.

In

policy, this

for the safety

and

welfare of Idaho citizens, then those types ofpublic policy considerations and analysis are best

left

Court has previously found that

if public

policy considerations need t0 be
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t0 Idaho’s legislative

branch because

it

has the “resources for the research, study and proper

formulation of broad public policy.” Id. (citing Anstine

v.

Hawkins, 92 Idaho 561, 563, 447 P.2d

677, 679 (1968)).

Since the record in this case

is

devoid of relevant evidence,

this

Court should not abandon

Idaho’s premises liability law requiring a case-by-case review 0f facts t0 determine the status 0f
the entrant

on another person’s land

an arbitrary

in favor 0f adopting

new

rule for

once class 0f

property owners. Rather, the better and more reasoned approach to addressing the legal issue 0f

Dupuis’ status in

does not come from adopting a

this case

new

arbitrary rule that could

negative consequences 0n Idaho’s existing premises liability law, but rather
existing premises liability

law

to the speciﬁc facts

Idaho’s existing premises liability law

is

0f this case. This

is

is t0

What the

have

applying Idaho’s

District

broad enough to recognize that even

Court
if

did.

Dupuis

should not be identiﬁed as an invitee under the undisputed material facts of this case does not mean
that a person injured

as an invitee.

0n a hospital’s premises under a

speciﬁc facts for each person.
entrant’s status

may change

0f cases

Because the

Court in

existing premises liability

its

it

three classes 0f entrants depending

also clear

while on another’s premises

to resolve these types

District

all

Such existing laws are

Maintaining Idaho’s present premises

because

of facts could not be classiﬁed

Indeed, Idaho’s existing premises liability laws are clear enough to recognize that

0n any given premise on any given day there may be

needed

different set

liability

law for

all

if

enough

0n the

t0 recognize that

g0 beyond the area of

an

invitation.

landowners provides the ﬂexibility

fairly.

this case correctly

law was the best approach

perceived that application 0f Idaho’s

to resolving the legal issue before

it

and

understood and correctly applied that law to the undisputed material facts of this case,

ruling should be

afﬁrmed on appeal.
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The

C)

District

Court appropriately granted summary judgment

in this case because

there are n0 material disputed facts.
After concluding the Dupuis was a licensee 0n
correctly perceived that

to

Dupuis as a

licensee.

it

R Vol.

Under Idaho law,

A

person

mere

next needed t0 analyze Whether

who

5, at

the duty

EIRMC’s

premises, the District Court

EIRMC violated the duty of care it owed

pp. 419-421.

owed

t0 a licensee is narrow:

enters the property of another With passive permission or as a

social guest traditionally has

been held t0 understand that he must take the

This entrant, classiﬁed by the law as a licensee,
expected t0 be alert and to protect himself from the risks he encounters.
land as the possessor uses

Accordingly, the duty
restricted.

it.

owed

to a licensee

with respect t0 such risks

is

is

narrowly

The possessor is required simply to share his knowledge of dangerous

conditions 0r dangerous activities with the licensee. When such a warning has
been given, the possessor’s knowledge is n0 longer superior to that of the
licensee, and the possessor’s duty extends n0 farther. Of course, the possessor
must avoid willful and wanton injury to the licensee. But ordinary negligence
allowing an unsafe condition or activity 0n the property is insufﬁcient, by itself,
t0 impose liability to a licensee.
Keller, 105 Idaho at 652, 671 P.2d at 1115 (citing Wilson

Further, the landowner only

(1959).

the land that are: (1)

by

the licensee.

owes a duty

known to the landowner; ﬂl,

Chapman

v.

to

(2)

v.

warn a

Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 347 P.2d 341
licensee of dangerous conditions

on

unknown to and not reasonably discoverable

Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 762-33, 215 P.3d 478, 482-83 (2009)

(ﬁnding that IDJI 3.15 correctly summarizes When a landowner owes a duty to warn a licensee
and, therefore,

was an appropriate

instruction for the jury).

Because Dupuis’ sole argument before the
licensee,

District

Court was

that,

even

if

he were a

EIRMC violated its duty to warn him of the condition of its parking lot, the District Court

correctly found in this case that

Dupuis could only recover from

the dangerous condition in the parking lot

EIRMC

if

he could establish that

was unknown and not reasonably discoverable
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to him,

ﬂ

that

EIRMC had a greater or superior knowledge of the dangerous condition.” R V01.

208-09; Tr V01.

looked

1,

at p. 23:5-18;

at the relevant

and R V01.

5, at p. 6.

T0 that end,

the District Court appropriately

Court appropriately took judicial notice 0f the certiﬁed United States

weather data that had been entered into the record.

R

Vol.

5, at

Evidence 201(b) provides that a court may take judicial notice 0f a
accurate determination

resort t0 sources

by

requested to d0 so by a party. Id.
is

A

pp. 420-421.

fact

When the

Idaho Rule of

fact is capable

of

Whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

Pursuant to that rule, the court

adjudicative fact

pp.

evidence of record as to these two essential elements 0f Dupuis’ claim.

First, the District

I.R.E. 201(b).

1, at

may

take such judicial notice on

its

own

0r

district court’s decision t0 take judicial notice

a discretionary determination, Which

is

appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. See Fortin

when
of an

reviewed by Idaho appellate courts on
v.

State,

160 Idaho 437, 442, 374 P.3d

600, 605 (2016).
In this case, the certiﬁed weather data for the Idaho Falls, Idaho area for the dates relevant

hereto

is

the type of source

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Furthermore,

this

source provides evidence as t0 facts that are capable 0f accurate determination, such as the

recorded temperatures

at

a speciﬁc time and the recorded observations for

snow

falling in that

area.

Although the

District

Court did not specify whether

it

was

similarly taking judicial notice

of the KIPI weather almanac data that had also been entered into in the record in
contradiction,

data.

it

would be

this case

Without

similarly appropriate t0 take judicial notice of this additional weather

Not only is this weather data consistent With the information provided in the certiﬁed weather

data for that area,

it is

also consistent With the deposition testimony 0f

Dupuis and

his spouse.

Furthermore, the KIPI weather almanac data for the Idaho Falls, Idaho area tracked historical
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weather information that

The

is

not included in the other certiﬁed weather data

District Court correctly observed in this case that the

weather data included in the

record was consistent With the deposition testimony of Dupuis and his wife,
the “blizzard” conditions in the Idaho Falls, Idaho, area

.

Who both testiﬁed that

were so severe during the evening hours

0f January 23, 2017, and throughout the early morning hours of January 24, 2017, that Carol

Dupuis purposely postponed going

t0 the

emergency room

for examination of her signiﬁcant chest

pains for fear of having t0 travel to the hospital in the “absolute worst conditions.” R. V01.

pp.

1,

71-72 (Carol Dupuis Depo. pp. 28:22 t0 29:14) and 74 (Carol Dupuis Depo. pp. 41:24 t0 42:15);

R V01.

1, p.

The
was, in
5, at p.

58 (Victor Dupuis Depo.
District

fact,

p.

82:17-25, 83:19 to 84:5).

clearly established that

Dupuis

on the evening 0f January 24, 2017.

R V01.

Court further observed that the record before

aware 0f the condition 0f the parking

42 1. For instance, Dupuis

states as

lot

it

an undisputed fact in his brief in opposition to EIRMC’s

motions for summary judgment that he and his son, Gordon, recognized that the parking
“very slick” as they crossed
Vol.

1,

at p.

it

EIRMC’S Motion

for

Summary Judgment

“[Dupuis] and Gordon walked slowly to the main entrance of EIRMC because the parking

Similarly,

R V01

was

to enter the hospital at approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening.

199 (stating in his Opposition to

very slick”); see also

lot

1, p.

Dupuis averted

lot

R

that:

was

78 (Gordon Dupuis Depo. pp. 23:16-22, 2525-10).
in his

Complaint commencing

and walked as

this legal action:

he could along the shoveled and
deiced sidewalks, Eventually, in order t0 reach his car, he had t0 leave the
sidewalk and begin to cross the surface 0f the parking lot. Plaintiff was
proceeding with caution as he recognized that the parking lot surface was
Plaintiff left the building

snow packed and/or
See

R Vol.

1, at p.

far as

icy.

9 (quoting from Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Dupuis’ Complaint
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and Demandfor Jury

Trial) (emphasis added).

a

summary judgment,

Although such pleading

the above statement

is,

is

insufﬁcient on

its

own to

in fact, corroborated

by

support a ﬁnding in

the

sworn deposition

testimony of record. Speciﬁcally, Dupuis testiﬁed under oath that he did not observe any changes
in the parking lot’s conditions as

he was returning back t0 his car that evening than What he had

observed

when he and Gordon had

hospital.

R V01.

1, p.

61 (Victor Dupuis Depo. p. 103210-15).

admitted as an uncontested fact that he recognized
crossed

it

earlier that

evening

at

6:00 p.m.

material change in the parking lot

was admitting

that

that

when he

totality

t0 his car.

started crossing

was “very

slick”

When he

it

at

8:00 p.m. that evening, Dupuis

lot

was

still

“very slick.”

lot’s

condition that evening as he

this case

was walking

Because he had actual knowledge 0f the slippery condition of the parking

burden 0f proof at

trial to

establish that

as a matter of law, in granting

licensee arises,

lot’s condition.

summary judgment
two

Dupuis primarily argues

in favor

meet

his

EIRMC

lot,

had a

Because Dupuis cannot meet his
the District Court did not

of EIRMC in

err,

this matter.

essential elements before a landowner’s duty t0

that the District

had a knowledge of the condition 0f the parking
failed t0

at trial to establish that

EIRMC had a duty to warn,

In failing to recognize that there are

Dupuis has

lot

Dupuis has

of this evidence, the District Court correctly concluded in

duty to warn him, as a licensee, of the parking

EIRMC

stated previously,

EIRMC’S parking

Dupuis, as a licensee, could not meet his burden of proof

warn a

earlier t0 enter the

Thus, by acknowledging that he could observe n0

Dupuis had actual knowledge of the parking

back

As

he recognized that the condition 0f the parking

Based upon the

few hours

ﬁrst crossed the parking lot a

Court erred in not ﬁnding that

was superior

t0 his.

Because

burden 0n one of the essential elements of his claim for

failure t0

lot that

Court need not consider the evidence 0f the other element of the claim. See Holdaway,

warn,

this

158

610, 349, at 1201 (ﬁnding that the absence of a genuine issue fact as to one essential element

at
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of a

claim renders facts as to the other elements irrelevant, even

plaintiff’s

those facts are in

if

Regardless, the District Court did not err in this case in also ﬁnding that Dupuis’

dispute).

knowledge of EIRMC’S parking

EIRMC’S knowledge

on the evening of January 24, 2017, was

more superior knowledge of the conditions of the parking

because he had crossed the same exact path through that

was “very

R V01

recognized even then that the

lot

103: 10-15 and 105: 15-21), 78

(Gordon Dupuis Depo.

p. 34:18-20);

see also

at least

R

V01.

equal t0

Indeed, the record in this case could reasonably be interpreted t0

that day.

reveal that Dupuis had a

lot

1, p.

slick.”

lot just

1,

p. 23:

two hours

lot in that area

prior t0 this fall

pp. 61-62 (Victor

and

Dupuis Depo. pp.

10-22) and 80 (Gordon Dupuis Depo.

127 (providing the recorded temperature for the evening of

January 24, 2017).

Dupuis’ reliance 0n the fact that two other individuals had slipped on
January 2017 and one other individual had slipped 0n

earlier in

month

is

misguided.

First, the issue in this

24, 2017, concerning the condition of

incidents relied

its

case

is

rear loading

dock

parking

lot.

Because none of the three
lot, it

its

it

parking

slip-and-fall

EIRMC any knowledge concerning the condition of its parking lots.

should not be inferred that such incidents gave
lot

earlier that

should not be inferred that

Similarly, these other incidents did not occur during the January 24, 2017,

therefore,

sidewalks

EIRMC’S knowledge on the evening of January

upon by Dupuis occurred 0n EIRMC’s parking

these unrelated incidents gave

its

EIRMC’S

snowstorm and,

EIRMC knowledge of the condition of

on the evening 0f January 24, 2017. Indeed, Dupuis did not present the

District

Court with any evidence concerning the actual details of any of these other incidents that could

have allowed the District Court

t0 reasonably

compare those incidents

determine whether these other incidents should be inferred as giving
condition of its parking lot 0n the evening 0f January 24, 2017, that
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t0 the facts

EIRMC

of his case to

knowledge 0n the

was superior

to his.

Without

any evidence establishing

that these other incidents put

knowledge, the District Court and

As noted
an

EIRMC

employee about the parking

the condition of

else

Court would simply be

previously, the record doesn’t even

earlier that evening.

anyone

this

had

its

Similarly, there

parking

fallen in

lot at

EIRMC

is

show

lot’s slippery

left to

condition

When

else

EIRMC’S

parking

lot

0n

this issue.

on that day prior

t0

they entered the hospital

complaining to

any time 0n January 24, 2017, nor

In this case, the District Court had no evidence before

ﬁnd that EIRMC had

speculate

of superior

Dupuis or Gordon complained

that

n0 evidence 0f anyone

in a position

is

EIRMC

about

there any evidence that

t0 0r after Dupuis’ slip-and-fall.

it

upon which

it

could reasonably

a knowledge of the condition 0f its parking lot 0n the evening 0f January 24,

2017, that was superior t0 Dupuis’ actual knowledge as supported by the record. Based upon the
totality

of the evidence before

it,

0r the lack thereof, the District Court appropriately found in this

case that Dupuis’ knowledge of the parking lot that evening

knowledge and,

therefore,

EIRMC violated the

Dupuis had

duty of care

it

was

at least

equal t0 the

failed t0 establish the necessary elements

owed

to

warn him

EIRMC’S

of his claim that

as a licensee of the condition 0f

its

parking

condition in which

EIRMC

lot.

Because Dupuis, as a licensee, took EIRMC’s parking

was using

it,

he was expected t0 be

he crossed the

lot that

alert

and

to protect

lot in the

himself from the risks he encountered as

evening. Keller, 105 Idaho at 652, 671 P.2d at 1115. Furthermore, because

Dupuis was a licensee 0n EIRMC’S premises, evidence 0f ordinary negligence
and of itself,

t0

impose

liability

Therefore, based

upon

Court correctly determined in

Dupuis as a licensee on

its

upon EIRMC.

is

insufﬁcient, in

Id.

the totality of the evidence as applied t0 Idaho law, the District

this case that

premises

at the

EIRMC

did not Violate the duty of care

time 0f this

fall.
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it

owed

to

In so concluding, the District Court

did not need to

make any

credibility determinations,

reading 0f the District Court’s

Memorandum

it

it

need

weigh any

to

it

based

its

decision solely 0n the uncontroverted

had appropriately taken judicial notice and beyond

0n the deposition testimony of Dupuis and his family members, which the
as true With regard t0 Dupuis’

District

knowledge 0f the condition of EIRMC’S parking

pp. 420-421. Because this evidence

elements of Dupuis’s claim that

Indeed, a

facts.

Decision reveals that the District Court did not

engage in this type 0f improper behavior. Instead,
certiﬁed weather data for Which

nor did

that

violated

its

lot.

R V01.

at

were genuine issues of fact concerning

5, at

essential

duty to warn Dupuis, the District Court was

not required t0 consider other evidence in the record that was not related to the issue before
if there

relied

Court accepted

was the most relevant evidence concerning one of the

EIRMC

it

this additional evidence.

it,

even

See Holdaway, 158 Idaho

610, 349 P.3d at 1201 (ﬁnding that “[t]he absence 0f a genuine issue of fact with regard to an

essential element

of the

plaintiff” s

claim renders any other potential issues of fact irrelevant”).

Thus, after ﬁnding that Dupuis was unable to establish an essential element of his claim
that

EIRMC

violated

its

duty to warn Dupuis, the District Court correctly perceived that

not consider Dupuis’ evidence concerning the duty of care

had already found him t0 be a
perceived that

it

licensee.

R V01.

5, at p.

need not consider EIRMC’ s motion to

owed

t0

it

need

an invitee because the court

421. Similarly, the District Court correctly
strike the opinions

of Roland York because

such motion had become moot based upon the District Court’s grant 0f summary judgment.

Id.

Because the District Court correctly stated the duty 0f care owed to a licensee under Idaho’ s

law and correctly applied the applicable law to the undisputed material

facts

should afﬁrm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. In so doing,
that the District

of this case,
this

this

Court

Court should ﬁnd

Court did not make any inappropriate credibility determinations, nor did

improperly weigh the evidence before

it,

nor did

it

fail to

it

consider the relevant evidence of record.
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For these reasons, the District Court’s grant of summary judgment should be afﬁnned 0n

this

appeal.

CONCLUSION

V.

Based upon the foregoing,
Court’s

Memorandum

judgment
District

is

EIRMC

respectfully requests this Court to

afﬁrm the

Decision and Order and Judgment in this matter. Afﬁrming

this order

appropriate under the undisputed material facts 0f this premises liability case.

Court correctly applied Idaho law in ﬁnding that Dupuis was a licensee 0n

premises

District

at the

time 0f his

not Violate the duty of care

DATED this

3rd

fall

it

and further correctly applied Idaho law

owed to Dupuis,

as a licensee

on

its

in

ﬁnding

that

and

The

EIRMC’S

EIRMC

did

premises.

day 0f September 2020.

By

/s/

R. William

Hancock

R. William Hancock,

Jr.
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